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Articles
ECONOMIC TRENDS AND JUDICIAL
OUTCOMES:
A MACROTHEORY OF THE COURT
THOMAS BRENNAN†
LEE EPSTEIN††
NANCY STAUDT†††
ABSTRACT
We investigate the effect of economic conditions on the voting
behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices. We theorize that Justices are
akin to voters in political elections; specifically, we posit that the
Justices will view short-term and relatively minor economic
downturns—recessions—as attributable to the failures of elected
officials, but will consider long-term and extreme economic
contractions—depressions—as the result of exogenous shocks largely
beyond the control of the government. Accordingly, we predict two
patterns of behavior in economic-related cases that come before the
Court: (1) in typical times, when the economy cycles through both
recessionary and prosperous periods, the Justices will punish the
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elected branches of government when the economy contracts by
voting less frequently for the government; and (2) in atypical times,
when the economy moves into a period of deep depression, the
Justices will work with the other branches of government by voting
more frequently for the government. We test our hypotheses through
statistical analysis of taxation opinions rendered by the Supreme
Court during the period from 1913 to 1929 (a relatively normal
period) and the period from 1930 to 1940 (the Great Depression). We
find broad support for our hypothesis in the data we analyze, and we
verify that our results are robust to a change in the measure of the
economic condition as well as to a change in the specification of the
regression model. We conclude that U.S. Supreme Court Justices
exhibit voting patterns similar to voters in political elections when it
comes to the economy.
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INTRODUCTION
Scholars, commentators, and journalists have long noted the
tight interconnection between politics and economics. Whereas
elected officials almost universally pursue the goals of national
economic growth and stability, specific policies and programs tend to
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1

diverge depending on political preferences. Voters, in turn, rely on
economic outcomes as signals of policymaking competence, and
consequently reward (or punish) incumbent politicians and parties for
the market conditions that emerge. Voters often perceive a declining
national economy as evidence of policymaking failure on the part of
the president and members of Congress and thus seek to discipline
them by casting votes for their opponents in the election cycle.
Prosperous conditions, by contrast, imply effective economic
management and generally increase the vote share of incumbent
2
parties. So important are economic indicators to the electorate that
more than a few forecasters have suggested that variables such as
GDP, job creation, and consumer satisfaction are just as salient—and
perhaps more so—than the other factors traditionally believed to
3
predict election outcomes.
This link between economics and politics is an empirical reality
that scholars have documented in a wide range of contexts: the
strongest connection emerges in presidential elections, but the link
also surfaces at notable and significant levels in House, Senate, and
4
gubernatorial races. Indeed, whereas commentators debate a number

1. See, e.g., ALBERTO ALESINA, NOURIEL ROUBINI & GERALD D. COHEN, POLITICAL
CYCLES AND THE MACROECONOMY 47 (1997) (noting that conservative and liberal politicians
tend to pursue divergent policies with respect to unemployment and inflation).
2. See, e.g., RAYMOND M. DUCH & RANDOLPH T. STEVENSON, THE ECONOMIC VOTE:
HOW POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS CONDITION ELECTION RESULTS 212 (2008);
Allan Drazen, The Political Business Cycle After 25 Years, in NBER MACROECONOMICS
ANNUAL 2000, at 75, 83 (Ben S. Bernanke & Kenneth Rogoff eds., 2000) (noting that a
consensus has emerged that aggregate economic conditions before an election, specifically per
capita output or income growth, have a significant effect on voting patterns in the United
States); see also Henry W. Chappell, Jr. & William R. Keech, A New View of Political
Accountability for Economic Performance, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 10, 10–22 (1985) (presenting a
model of economically sophisticated voters as well as empirical evidence that such a model
performs well in explaining voter behavior); Ray C. Fair, The Effect of Economic Events on
Votes for President, 60 REV. ECON. & STAT. 159, 171 (1978) (concluding that real economic
activity in the year of an election has an important effect on votes for president); D. Roderick
Kiewiet, Policy-Oriented Voting in Response to Economic Issues, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 448,
449 (1981) (finding that unemployment concerns are likely to shift a voter toward the
Democratic party). But see Francisco Arcelus & Allan H. Meltzer, The Effect of Aggregate
Economic Variables on Congressional Elections, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1232, 1238 (1975)
(concluding that aggregate economic variables, with the possible exception of inflation, do not
affect the participation rate or relative party strength in the case of congressional elections).
3. See, e.g., Symposium, Forecasting the 2008 National Elections, 41 PS: POL. SCI. & POL.
679 (2008).
4. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. LEWIS-BECK & TOM W. RICE, FORECASTING ELECTIONS 30–33,
64–68, 86, 105–08, 121 (1992) (investigating presidential, House, Senate, and gubernatorial
elections in the United States and presidential and National Assembly elections in France).
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of issues—such as whether individual voting is retrospective or
prospective and which economic factors have the greatest effect on
5
election outcomes —none seem to quarrel with the idea that the
macroeconomic factors work as a proxy for policymaking competence
and, for this reason, trend with voting patterns.
In this Essay, we investigate whether economic conditions affect
perceptions of policymaking competence—and thus voting
behavior—in an altogether different context: the U.S. Supreme
Court. Specifically, we seek to determine whether the Justices look to
the economy for purposes of assessing government policy and then
use this information in casting votes for, or against, the government’s
position in the cases and controversies that appear on their docket.
Quite a few scholars have theorized how and why the Justices—as
lawyers, political appointees, and members of the highest unelected
branch of government—prioritize legal, political, and institutional
factors in their decisionmaking process, but few have considered
whether Court members take it upon themselves to monitor national
economic conditions and then rely on these conditions in the judicial
6
context. In fact, one might ask whether, as a positive matter, the
Justices have (or believe themselves to have) the requisite
information and expertise to render an opinion on the success or
failure of these often complex policies and programs in their own
decisionmaking process. And even if such expertise were present on
the bench, one might ask what the Justices gain by inserting
themselves into national economic debates.
To answer these questions we posit a theory of judicial
decisionmaking that incorporates three simple claims. Specifically, we
argue that Justices are akin to voters in that they (1) prefer a
prosperous economy to one that is deteriorating, (2) assess the
government’s economic management skills by observing changes in
the economy, and (3) cast votes in a manner that seeks to ensure that
policymakers pursue the best and most effective programs for
promoting national growth and productivity. In setting forth our new
macrotheory of the Court, we do not mean to suggest that the Justices
prioritize matters economic over legal, political, and institutional
5. See, e.g., DUCH & STEVENSON, supra note 2, at 8–16 (discussing various theories of
economic voting).
6. Robert Erikson, Michael Mackuen, and James Stimson indirectly investigate the effects
of the economy on judicial decisionmaking in their book, ROBERT S. ERIKSON, MICHAEL B.
MACKUEN & JAMES A. STIMSON, THE MACRO POLITY 311–16 (2002) (investigating the effect
of public opinion on Supreme Court Justices via “mood measure”).
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concerns; rather, we mean only to suggest that national economic
conditions are relevant to the judicial decisionmaking process in a
manner never before explored in the literature.
How the Justices choose to use economic factors, if they in fact
do, is ultimately an empirical question, but we theorize that, like
voters generally, members of the Court adopt two discrete patterns of
voting when it comes to the economy. During typical business
cycles—characterized by the repeated sequence of recessions, giving
way to periods of prosperity, which are then followed again by
recessions—we expect the Justices to follow the lead of the general
electorate by punishing and rewarding Congress and the executive for
7
the economic conditions that emerge. In atypical times—those that
are associated with massive economic downturns and widespread
financial harm—we expect the Court will refrain from secondguessing the policy decisions of the elected branches and, in fact, will
seek to support the national government in its attempt to stabilize the
economy—much as citizens (and judges) rally around the flag in the
8
face of foreign threats and national emergencies. In sum, we theorize
that the Justices will act like voters: they will view short-term and
relatively minor economic downturns—recessions—as attributable to
the failures of elected officials, but will view the long-term and
extreme economic contractions—depressions—as the result of
exogenous shocks largely beyond the control of the government and,
consequently, a time for team work and not finger pointing.
We test our macrotheory of judicial decisionmaking in the
context of taxation opinions rendered by the Supreme Court during
two continuous but discrete periods, from 1912 to 1929 and from 1930

7. Macroeconomists spend quite a bit of time studying the business cycle in part because
the ups and downs in the economy are recurrent and expected but also because there is always a
possibility of a severe and prolonged economic downturn that could lead to widespread harm.
For an excellent discussion of the business cycle, see ANDREW B. ABEL, BEN S. BERNANKE &
DEAN CROUSHORE, MACROECONOMICS 282–85 (6th ed. 2008).
8. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BRODY, ASSESSING THE PRESIDENT: THE MEDIA, ELITE
OPINION, AND PUBLISC SUPPORT 45–78 (1991); JOHN E. MUELLER, WAR, PRESIDENTS AND
PUBLIC OPINION 208–13 (1973); Richard A. Brody, International Crises: A Rallying Point for the
President?, PUB. OPINION, Dec.–Jan. 1984, at 41, 41–43, 60; Samuel Kernell, Explaining
Presidential Popularity: How Ad Hoc Theorizing, Misplaced Emphasis, and Insufficient Care in
Measuring One’s Variables Refuted Common Sense and Led Conventional Wisdom Down the
Path of Anomalies, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 506, 509–10, 512–13, 518–19 (1978); John E. Mueller,
Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson, 64 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 18, 18–34 (1970); Lee
Sigelman & Pamela Johnston Conover, The Dynamics of Presidential Support During
International Conflict Situations: The Iranian Hostage Crisis, 3 POL. BEHAV. 303, 303 (1981).
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9

to 1940. The first period, which includes five relatively minor
10
business cycles, enables us to investigate whether the typical
business cycle has any effect on judicial decisionmaking. The second
11
period, which is often labeled the Great Depression, allows us to
explore the possible effects of a severe economic crisis on Court
outcomes. Although our findings are preliminary, we find support for
both components of our theory. In the years before 1930, our data
indicate the Justices were willing to punish the federal government
for economic declines as evidenced by a corresponding decrease in
the government’s win rate. During the 1930s, however, we find that
the government fared better in the Court—the government’s win rate
actually increased as the economy continued to tank. Taken
collectively, these findings enhance our understanding of judicial
behavior in several ways. Primarily, they provide some evidence that
the Justices believe they have a role to play in assuring national
economic prosperity and growth. But the findings also challenge the
conventional belief that the Court maintained a strong and
unambiguous bias against President Roosevelt’s administration prior
to the announcement of the Court-packing plan (we find the opposite
12
is true in the context of taxation). In addition, the findings may help
explain Supreme Court votes in the post–World War II era and, at
the same time, forecast upcoming votes in the context of the serious
13
national economic decline that began in 2008.
Our study unfolds as follows. Part I outlines our new
macrotheory of the Court and investigates how it is similar to, and
different from, two other prominent theories of the judiciary—the
legal and the political accounts of judicial decisionmaking. Part II
explains our data collection procedures and outlines the various
empirical models that constitute the tests of our theory. In Part III,
we describe the results of our empirical assessment, which, to
reiterate, show that the Justices rely on the economy as a signal of
9. For an explanation of why we focus on taxation in these two specific eras, see infra
notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Table 5: The Business Cycle; see also Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, http://www.nber.org/cycles (last visited Feb. 13,
2009) (providing the chronology of economic peaks and troughs as identified by the National
Bureau of Economic Research).
11. E.g., ABEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 285–87; see also Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
supra note 10 (providing the chronology of economic peaks and troughs as identified by the
National Bureau of Economic Research).
12. See infra notes 70–75 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part III and accompanying text.
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policymaking competence in periods of the “typical” business cycle
but defer to the government in times of economic emergencies,
including the Great Depression. We conclude by discussing the limits
of our findings, as well as future applications of our theoretical
approach.
I. A MACROTHEORY OF THE COURT
A. The Economy as a Signal
Our account begins with what we believe is an uncontroversial
claim: the Justices, like virtually all policymakers and citizens, prefer
national prosperity to a deteriorating economy plagued by high
unemployment, high inflation, and low productivity. Perhaps this
preference emerges from the Justices’ role as national leaders in the
development of law and legal policy, or perhaps it stems from their
status as individuals who care very much about their own private
investments and purchasing power. We do not seek to explain why
the Justices prefer national economic success to failure; rather our
point is this: the Justices gain utility from certain economic conditions
and suffer disutility from others.
Our theory, of course, does not stop with this simple conjecture.
We further hypothesize that the Justices act in a manner that
promotes their economic interests through the decisionmaking
process. Specifically, we theorize that members of the Court seek to
foster competent economic management in the elected branches of
government by expressing support for executive and legislative
policies in times of economic prosperity and disapproval during
certain kinds of economic downturns—those that the Justices believe
are the product of inept government management. We offer more
14
detail on this component of our theory in this Section, but first we
highlight that our account suggests that the Justices implement a
sanctioning system that will directly affect the U.S. government when
litigating and defending economic policies before the Supreme Court;
when the economy is expanding, our theory predicts that the Justices
will favor the government’s legal position, but as the economy
contracts we expect that the Justices will take a dim view of the
government’s policy or program and cast a greater number of votes
against the government’s legal interest.

14. See infra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
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Our account, thus, indicates that Justices act like voters during
election cycles. Just as voters take cues from the economy, attributing
good economic times to effective policymaking in the elected
branches of government and (most) bad economic times to
15
government incompetence, so do the Justices. And just as voters
punish (or reward) politicians based on the relative state of the
economy, so too do the Justices. Of course, the Justices, unlike voters,
do not have the power to throw out (or retain) incumbents, but they
can reject (or support) the government’s policies through their
judicial decisionmaking process. Assuming, as we do, that both the
voters and the Justices rationally prefer economic prosperity to
economic loss, the electoral success of the incumbent government
along with its win rate in Court should trend with national economic
conditions.
Importantly, we do not theorize that the Justices, or voters
generally, treat every economic downturn equivalently or even
primarily as caused by government ineptitude. As suggested above,
we theorize—along with most macroeconomists—that economic
trends are associated not only with the choices made by the nation’s
leaders but also with unrelated and unexpected shocks to the
economy such as wars, oil price fluctuations, trade barriers imposed
16
by foreign governments, harvest failures, and so forth. This is a
distinction with meaning: when the voters and, more importantly for
our project, the Justices view the downturn as a product of
substandard government policy choices—not of uncontrollable and
exogenous shocks—they will often punish the elected branches at the
ballot box and in the courtroom. But when the Justices believe that
the economic crisis is the result of factors largely beyond the control
of the government, they will often not sanction federal policymakers
but instead seek to work as a team with the other branches of
government to remedy the national crisis, much as voters and judges
tend to rally around the president in times of foreign threats and
17
nationwide emergencies.

15. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
16. See ALBERTO ALESINA & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, PARTISAN POLITICS, DIVIDED
GOVERNMENT, AND THE ECONOMY 195 (1995) (exploring “political” and “nonpolitical” shock
to the economy); ALESINA ET AL., supra note 1, at 47 (same); DUCH & STEVENSON, supra note
2, at 131–77 (same).
17. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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Economic experts cannot hope to distinguish precisely between
18
these two types of economic downturns —those caused by
policymaking failures and those that emerge from outside forces—
and we do not believe that the Justices have higher levels of economic
proficiency than trained professionals. Indeed, it is possible, perhaps
likely, that a complex amalgamation of factors inside and outside of
the government’s control influences national economic conditions,
making it extremely difficult to distinguish useful federal policies
from those that impose harm across the nation. Again, we do not
expect the Justices to have skill and expertise regarding modern
macroeconomic theory, but we do suppose they are able to
distinguish typical and recurrent economic downturns, often labeled
recessions, from atypical and rare conditions associated widespread
poverty and hardship such as that observed in the 1930s (and also,
perhaps, during the serious national economic decline that began in
19
2008) and described as depressions. Regarding the typical ups and
downs that routinely take place in the economy, the Justices will
assign blame (credit) to Congress and the president out of a belief
(right or wrong) that the economic peaks and troughs lie within the
policymakers’ control. In atypical catastrophic periods, however, the
Justices will view economic conditions as primarily attributable to a
series of unexplained and exogenous shocks beyond the control of the
government and so will not seek to hold policymakers accountable.
Actually, as we suggest above, they will do quite the opposite: like
voters, the Justices will join with the government to fend off the crisis.
It is no mystery why we theorize that the economic downturns
associated with a typical business cycle—or more technically, the
repeated sequence of recessions, giving way to periods of prosperity,
which are then followed again by recessions—serve as a judicial proxy
18. See ABEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 282–440 (outlining the concept of the business cycle
and competing accounts of how and why the cycles emerge along with policymaking choices for
addressing economic downturns); see also FARROKH K. LANGDANA, MACROECONOMIC
POLICY: DEMYSTIFYING MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY 51–52 (2002) (describing the theory
of the business cycle in Keynesian macroeconomics).
19. As early as 1946, macroeconomists defined the typical business cycle as follows: “a
cycle consists of expansions occurring at about the same time in many economic activities,
followed by similarly general recessions, contractions, and revivals which merge into the
expansion phase of the next cycle; this sequence of changes is recurrent but not periodic; in
duration business cycles vary from more than one year to ten or twelve years.” ARTHUR F.
BURNS & WESLEY C. MITCHELL, MEASURING BUSINESS CYCLES 3 (1946) (emphasis added).
At the same time, experts note that “[s]ometimes—fortunately, not very often—these episodes
have been severe and prolonged” and “[i]f the recession is particularly severe, it becomes a
depression.” ABEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 282, 283.
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for government policymaking failure. Our account reflects the extant
literature in both political science and economics on the relevant
incentives of elected officials—specifically that presidents (and
members of Congress) are often willing to ignore, tolerate, or even
risk short-term national economic losses in off-election years for
20
political gain. The idea that politicians willingly adopt targeted
legislation for favored groups, often to the detriment of the aggregate
public, has become widely viewed as an empirical regularity by most
21
scholars of political economy. At the same time, the literature
suggests that elected officials will work hard to fend off protracted
periods of (costly) economic distortion given that such conditions not
only cause widespread and serious damage to citizens across the
22
nation, but also to the long-term political reputations of incumbents.
If this is so—if elected officials have an incentive to shirk in the short
term but not the long term, if they are willing to risk a series of minor
recessions but not vast and widespread depression-like conditions—
then it is perfectly reasonable for the Justices (and voters) to believe
that the economic downturns that take place during the typical
business cycle are the product of inept policies, whereas economic
crises (that is, precisely the economic conditions elected officials seek
to avoid) are beyond their control.
If our account accurately captures the Court’s interest in
promoting proficient policymaking, then it has strong empirical
implications. First, we expect the Justices to reward the elected
branches of government for periods of prosperity by adopting a
progovernment position in litigation involving economic policy. Put
another way, the government’s win rate should positively correlate
with various economic indicators, such as employment rates,
industrial production levels, GDP, and so forth. Conversely, when the
economy turns sour and the Justices hold elected actors responsible
out of a belief they have privileged their short-term electoral
interests—that is, during recessionary periods—we expect the Justices

20. See sources cited supra notes 16–18.
21. For a terrific description of the modern theories of Congress, see generally C.
LAWRENCE EVANS & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS UNDER FIRE: REFORM POLITICS AND
THE REPUBLICAN MAJORITY 166–72 (1997); FORREST MALTZMAN, COMPETING PRINCIPALS:
COMMITTEES, PARTIES, AND THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS 9–32 (1997); ERIK
SCHICKLER, DISJOINTED PLURALISM: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE U.S. CONGRESS 5–12 (2001); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Positive
Theories of Congressional Institutions, 19 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 149, 158 (1994).
22. See sources cited supra note 21.
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to punish the bad policy choices by ruling against the government. If
the Justices believe, however, that Congress and the president could
not have prevented the downturn if only because the crisis worked
against their electoral prospects—that is, during deep depressions—
we do not expect the Justices to hold them responsible or even to
second-guess their policymaking choices. In fact, we hypothesize that
the Justices will support the national government in its attempt to
stabilize the economy by deferring to its arguments in the economic
cases that appear on the docket.
These implications are relatively straightforward to assess and
we undertake that task in Part III. But before turning to the empirical
tests, two matters deserve attention. One concerns the relationship
between our account of judicial decisionmaking and the various other
theories of the Court in the literature. We explain how our new
theory fits within this literature in Section C. The second centers on
two questions about judicial behavior, specifically (1) why we expect
members of the Court considering cases involving economic policy to
align with the voting public and not the governing elite and (2) what
goals the Justices seek to achieve if, in fact, they vote in a manner that
is consistent with our macrotheory. We address both questions in
Section B.
B. Judicial Behavior: Voting with the Masses to Achieve Elite Goals?
Why would the Justices, as political appointees (nominated by
the president and approved by the Senate), echo or ally themselves
with the voting masses on economic issues and not with the
Washington elite who helped place them in power? The answer to
this question is simple: it is in the Justices’ best interests to side with
the voters. Recall that our theory is grounded in the idea that the
Justices prefer economic growth and stability to conditions associated
with economic decline. If the Justices believe that Congress and the
president are shirking their management responsibilities for, say,
political gain, and that this shirking has negatively affected the
economy, then it is entirely rational for the Justices to punish this
behavior in an effort to encourage policymakers to act in the best
interests of the nation. In short, if the Justices are able to mitigate the
impact of bad policy choices through the judicial process, Congress
and the president will be less likely to make bad economic decisions
in the future.
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Similarly, it is rational for the Justices to support the government
in its economic efforts if they believe outside forces have led to a
severe economic setback. In these circumstances, sanctioning elected
officials through the judicial decisionmaking process may aggravate
the nation’s declining economic circumstances, thereby undermining
the judicial goal of a stable and growing economy. Theorizing that the
Justices will increase their level of cooperation with the elected
branches in periods of a national crisis does not lead to the conclusion
23
that they suddenly become altruistic—they do not. Rather, our
approach to cooperation that is sparked by economic crisis suggests
that the advantages associated with putting the economy back on
24
track align with the Justices’ preference for national prosperity.

23. Dean Tjosvold, Cooperation Theory, Constructive Controversy, and Effectiveness:
Learning from Crisis, in TEAM EFFECTIVENESS AND DECISION MAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS
79, 89 (Richard A. Guzzo & Eduardo Salas eds., 1995) (suggesting that cooperation is not
explained by individual altruism but by rational self-interested behavior).
24. The notion that the Justices’ utility is linked to their level of teamwork with Congress
and the president is consistent with much of the existing literature on the Court. A number of
political and economic theorists have adopted the team model to investigate and explain various
features of the federal judiciary. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by a ResourceConstrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1605–
13 (1995) (adopting a team model to explain the hierarchical structure of the courts); Steven
Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 408–10
(1995) (same); Charles M. Cameron & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Law Creation by a Team of
Judges 1–21 (May 2, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.northwestern.
edu/faculty/conferences/research/Kornhauser.pdf (same). Moreover, just as the idea that the
Court will at times engage in a team effort to advance broad social goals is not new, the idea
that exposure or vulnerability to harm or loss increases individuals’ desire to cooperate is not
novel. This dynamic—perceived vulnerability leading to increased levels of cooperation—has
been observed in many contexts in both the private and public spheres. See, e.g., LAURENCE
BARTON, CRISIS IN ORGANIZATIONS: MANAGING AND COMMUNICATING IN THE HEAT OF
CHAOS 3–4 (1993); Tjosvold, supra note 23, at 80. Various scholars explain the phenomenon by
noting the widespread belief that individual utility is directly linked to group effort in times of
perceived threat; others argue that cooperation can be explained by the improved guidance and
direction that tend to emerge from group leaders in times of stress. But few scholars who study
cooperation and teamwork question its existence and its increased level in times of crisis.
Indeed, when it comes to federal lawmaking, a number of economic historians have noted the
readiness of policymakers to set aside partisan and ideological conflict to unite the government
and to better address national emergencies. See BARTON, supra, at 20–22; Tjosvold, supra note
23, at 86–92 (describing increased levels of teamwork during crises); see also ROBERT HIGGS,
CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
147–50 (1987) (describing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence with regard to war measures,
which often is seen as being slanted in favor of the government and out of line with the Court’s
other decisions); HAROLD C. RELYEA, NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS 7 (2007) (explaining
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of emergency presidential power during the Great
Depression); Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U.
PA. L. REV. 1639, 1671 (2003) (noting that collegiality and a group approach leads to better
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Cooperation and teamwork do not mean the Court will work
alongside Congress and the president to identify creative solutions to
the macroeconomic policy problems facing the nation. Rather, it is far
more likely that cooperation, if it exists, will emerge in the form of
increased deference to the U.S. government as litigant. This reflects
the Justices’ lack of expertise on economic issues, which strongly
25
contrasts with their expertise on legal and constitutional issues. With
limited information and know-how, the Justices will not seek to
participate in the creation of new macroeconomic policy but will
defer to the elected branches of government, which have greater
ability, experience, and knowledge to address economic issues.
Another set of questions centers on efficacy: Even assuming, as
we do, that the Justices rationally prefer economic prosperity to
economic loss, why would this preference affect the judicial process in
any observable way? Put differently, is it rational for the Justices to
believe they can promote effective policymaking in the elected
branches of government via their own decisionmaking process? This
question arises because the causal link between writing judicial
opinions and inducing policies and programs that promote national
economic interests is ambiguous (even if the Justices are capable of
rendering credible opinions on economic questions).
As it turns out, though, our argument that rational Justices will
look to the economy as a signal of policymaking competence in the
elected branches of government and will use their decisionmaking
power to support (or impede) the policies and programs that emerge
does not rest on the idea that Congress and the president will
immediately transform their economic policies in response to these
disciplinary measures. To be sure, a systematic decrease in the
government win rate in the face of a deteriorating economy is not the
preferred outcome of any administration, but we do not argue that
this penalty is equal to that threatened by the general voting public.
Instead, we argue that Justices may view their ability to refuse to
implement flawed policies and programs as a way to encourage better
economic management in the elected branches of government at the
margin. More importantly, we posit that judicial refusal to implement

jurisprudence); Lynn A. Stout, Judges as Altruistic Hierarchs, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1605,
1612–18 (2002) (explaining the emergence of altruism in the face of social dilemmas).
25. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 263–398 (4th ed. 2007)
(providing data on Justices’ backgrounds which reveals that they have not had much economic
training).
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perceived policy failures could work to limit possible damage to the
economy, thereby advancing the interests of the Justices. Similarly, in
times of crisis, we simply argue that the Court’s progovernment bias
will assist Congress and the president in the recovery effort, again
promoting the Justices’ interests in economic growth and stability.
C. Differences between the Macrotheory of the Court and the Legal
and Political Models of Decisionmaking
Before we begin to assess our theoretical and empirical claims,
an additional matter deserves some attention: how do the other
extant theories of judicial decisionmaking treat economic conditions?
This is an important question to raise for the following reason: if our
theoretical approach, however distinct it may be, yields precisely the
same implications as other theories, we will be unable to assess which
of the accounts best explains the decisions we observe. A review of
the two leading extant theories, the legal and the political, however,
suggests that this potential problem of equivalence is not likely to be
much of a concern.
Legal approaches suggest that the Justices rendering opinions in
cases and controversies privilege existing legal tenets and doctrine;
they are neutral deciders who look to the U.S. Constitution, statutes,
judicial precedent, and various other legally relevant materials to
26
maximize the correctness of answers to the legal issues presented.
Accounts of this sort do not necessarily imply that the Justices have
no personal preferences or are always in agreement with the
27
controlling legal precedent; rather, they hold that the Justices are
willing to set aside their views in order to create a rational, efficient,
and fair collection of laws and legal policies that ultimately are
28
perceived to promote the greater social good. Political theories of
26. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects
of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5 & n.20 (1994) (noting that the consensus
scholarly and judicial view on “correct outcomes” is that they reflect adherence to superior
court rulings); Kornhauser, supra note 24, at 1612.
27. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 26, at 27 n.99 (“[D]eference need not be based on the
assumption that the first court reached the correct result. Rather, the doctrines of stare decisis
and hierarchical precedent are based on the realization that various institutional and substantive
values are served, at least generally, if prior interpretations (whether or not correct) are
maintained into the present and future.”).
28. See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of a (Misunderstood)
Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771, 835–40 (2003) (providing a brief discussion of the values
in federal court decisionmaking and in the standing context in particular). Many scholars and
jurists subscribing to this theory believe, for example, that judicial obedience to and compliance
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judicial decisionmaking, by contrast, assume that the Justices have
29
political preferences that they seek to embed in their opinions. The
political theory does not ignore precedent or law-related factors but
views the development of doctrine as a way to implement partisan
30
and ideological viewpoints and to keep lower court judges in line.
Unlike the legal theory, however, the political theory of adjudication
views legal doctrine as a mechanism to realize judicial politics rather
than a path to inevitable, neutral, or fair outcomes based on full
consideration of the legal issues presented. The assumption that the
Justices pursue their own goals and aims does not always lead to the
conclusion that individual Justices have little regard for others and no

with the law leads to the uniform treatment of litigants and thus a perception of fairness.
Moreover, law and doctrine is arguably valuable because it enables individuals to predict
outcomes, which, in turn, permits an understanding of social and business interactions, allows
reliance on expectations, creates disincentives to litigate every conflict, and ultimately deters
expenditure of private and judicial resources. Finally, many argue that adherence to the law
fosters respect for the judiciary because it demonstrates that the Justices draw on a body of law
that represents collective experience over time rather than upon their own political and
ideological viewpoints. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 135 (2d ed. 1994) (asserting that
the strongest rationale for binding precedent is its usefulness in assuring like cases are treated
alike); RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION: TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL
JUSTIFICATION 69–72 (1961) (noting the link between fairness and binding precedent); see also
WASSERSTROM, supra, at 60 (stating that precedent is useful because it enables certainty that
would otherwise be impossible); Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course
and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 652–54 (2001)
(arguing that the doctrine of stare decisis is an appeal to a general principle of equality, a
“cousin [to] the Kantian principle of universalizability and the biblical Golden Rule,” and that
the public will view judicial decisionmaking as fair and not capricious if based on precedent);
David Lyons, Formal Justice and Judicial Precedent, 38 VAND. L. REV. 495, 496 (1985) (stating
that predictability in judicial decisionmaking is a key rationale for adhering to precedent).
29. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86 (2000); McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive
Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1636 (1995) (stating
the assumption that judges do not check their politics at the courtroom door, but rather act to
bring policy as close as possible to their own preferred outcome).
30. Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 68 (Spring 1994) (asserting that the Supreme Court uses legal doctrine as
a signal to lower courts about the range of opinions and outcomes that it will tolerate);
McNollgast, supra note 29, at 1641–56 (discussing precedent as a reflection of political
preferences); Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739, 740–
50 (1984) (looking at organization in the context of a firm); Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal
& Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme
Court–Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673, 673–92 (1994); see also Chad
Westerland et al., Lower Court Defiance of (Compliance with) the U.S. Supreme Court 5–6
(Apr. 9, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/
research/conferencepapers.2006MPSA.pdf (discussing three different but related branches of
agency theory).
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31

respect for the rule of law; the point of the political theory is that the
Justices are not objective decisionmakers who check their personal
32
opinions on legal controversies at the courtroom door. Instead the
Justices have personal viewpoints and give them weight when issuing
33
decisions.
How do these theories of adjudication account for
macroeconomic trends? The answer: macroeconomic trends are
completely irrelevant to the decisionmaking process in both models.
In the legal model, the Court’s responsibility is to ensure that
government policies comply with the mandates of relevant federal
laws and, absent a legal breach, the Court will uphold the government
activity as entirely legitimate. The legal model, in its most extreme
form, gives no consideration to the individual views of the Justices or
to national political, economic, or cultural trends, unless they are
somehow embedded into the law through the majoritarian process.
Giving consideration to these extralegal factors would undermine the
very purpose of the legal approach. Rather than merely applying the
relevant law, the Justices would be forced to study the economy.
Similarly situated litigants would be denied uniform treatment in the
courtroom, and perceptions of fairness would be damaged. In short, if
economic cycles could alter judicial interpretation of the laws,
litigants would be governed by the economy and not by law at all.

31. McNollgast, supra note 29, at 1636.
32. Indeed, even members of the federal bench acknowledge that judges are rational actors
seeking to embed their own ideas and views into the decisions they reach; judicial
decisionmakers, Judge Posner argues, seek to “impose their political vision on society” through
opinions and rulings, just as an artist imposes an aesthetic vision on society through art.
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 121 (1995); see also Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking
in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1457, 1472 (2003) (supporting the theory
that judges make decisions based upon policy preferences, especially with the increase in the
number of clerkships).
33. McNollgast, supra note 29, at 1635. Some scholars criticize judges who have strong
beliefs and then act upon them in the decisionmaking process, but this policy-oriented approach
is not universally disfavored. Indeed, some argue that if a judge believes the Constitution
requires an interpretation that conflicts with past precedent, the judge must ignore the
precedent when deciding cases. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against
Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 25–38 (1994) (arguing that if a court believes the
Constitution and precedent are in conflict, it just ignores the precedent); see also Orley
Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence
of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 281 (1995) (stating that
judges’ political interests may have a role in shaping outcomes but this is not necessarily
disturbing); Caminker, supra note 26, at 2–3 (discussing situations in which judges adhered to
their own idiosyncratic political or legal views despite clear Supreme Court precedent to the
contrary and noting scholars’ diverse reactions).
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Similarly, the political model leaves no room for macroeconomic
factors to affect judicial outcomes. The Justices may have strong
partisan positions on macroeconomic policymaking; various scholars,
for example, have theorized that members of the left-leaning parties
are more concerned with unemployment and growth and relatively
less concerned with inflation, whereas members of right-leaning
34
parties have just the opposite preferences. But these preferences
show up in the judicial decisionmaking process in systematic choices
in favor of the government or private individuals and do not change
with economic contractions and expansions. Indeed, judicial theorists
subscribing to the political theory assume that ideological preferences
35
are stable throughout the Justices’ careers and thus cannot shift with
the business cycle. Although this stability assumption is not explicit in
the extant literature, it can be found in nearly all the existing
measures of judicial preference and ideology as well in the empirical
36
tests of judicial decisionmaking.
In sum, our macrotheory of the Court argues that the Supreme
Court Justices, like most elected officials and citizens, gain utility
from national economic prosperity and disutility from declining
economic conditions. The theory, in turn, implies that judicial voting
will cycle with the economy; the Justices, in short, will seek to use
their decisionmaking power to promote adept policymaking inside
the executive and legislative branches of government. The legal and
political theories of the Court, by contrast, do not see a role for
economic conditions in the decisionmaking process; the former
suggests that legal rules explain judicial trends, whereas the latter
implies that observed outcomes are based on political preferences.
34. ALESINA ET AL., supra note 1, at 47.
35. See, e.g., Lawrence Baum, Comparing the Policy Positions of Supreme Court Justices
from Different Periods, 42 W. POL. Q. 509, 513–14 (1989).
36. Teams of scholars have begun to question the widespread assumption of preference
stability, but no scholar has yet offered a theory to explain why or when the Justices will alter
their political viewpoints. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., Do Political Preferences Change? A
Longitudinal Study of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 60 J. POL. 801, 806–08 (1998); Lee Epstein et
al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 NW.
U. L. REV. 1483, 1485–86, 1493–97 (2007). Our macrotheory of the Court offers a theoretical
account for this finding in the economic context. If the Justices do indeed modify their
decisionmaking to account for national economic cycles then we would expect ideological drift:
both liberal and conservative Justices would show an increased propensity to favor the federal
government when the economy turns sour. Because decisions that work in favor of the
government are perceived as liberal if rendered in the economic context, the theory would
suggest that Justices will systematically appear more liberal in times of economic downturn and
more conservative in times of economic upturn.

BES IN FINAL.DOC

1208

5/5/2009 4:01:11 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:1191

II. ASSESSING A MACROTHEORY OF THE COURT
Having outlined our theory and addressed some important
questions, we turn to a simple empirical test of our model. In Section
A, we outline our overall assessment plan and the steps we took to
implement it, and in Part III we report our results. In this preliminary
study, as noted in Part I, we find quite a bit of support for a
macrotheory of the Court.
A. The Basic Plan
Our primary objective is to develop a richer and more systematic
understanding of whether and how the economy affects judicial
decisionmaking. To advance our understanding of the Court, we
conducted a preliminary test of our macrotheory of the judiciary in
the context of federal taxation cases decided in two historical eras of
the twentieth century: 1912–1930 and 1930–1940.
Our focus on these two historical eras reflects our theoretical
account. Whereas the economy experienced ups and downs during
both eras, our theory anticipated different responses from the
Justices. For cases in the first era—an era of relative prosperity,
though with the typical ups and downs—we expected to find the
Court rewarding the government during peaks and punishing it
during the (relative) downturns. In the second era—when, by any
definition, the country experienced an economic crisis of epic
37
proportions —we expected precisely the opposite: that the Justices
would join with the other branches in an effort to prevent even
further decline, deferring to, not punishing, the government in its
litigation efforts. However preliminary, we think this test of our
theory is a particularly difficult one. Given the voluminous literature
on the showdown between President Roosevelt and the Court, it
would seem—in contrast to our theory—that the Justices did anything
38
but defer to the government in times of economic crisis. We shall
see.
37. See ABEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 285–86 (“The worst economic contraction in the
history of the United States was the Great Depression of the 1930s. . . . To appreciate how
severe the Great Depression was, compare it with the two worst post-World War II recessions
of 1973-1975 and 1981-1982. In contrast to the 30% real GDP decline and 25% unemployment
rate of the Great Depression, in the 1973-1975 recession real GDP fell by 3.4% and the
unemployment rate rose from about 4% to 9%; in the 1981-1982 recession real GDP fell by
2.8% and the unemployment rate rose from about 7% to about 11%.”).
38. See, e.g., ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 86–114
(1941); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
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We could use several legal contexts to test our theory, but we
believe that taxation is an excellent venue for investigating the effects
of the economy on judicial behavior for several reasons. First, our
theory implies that the U.S. government’s win rate in the Supreme
Court will correlate with economic conditions; thus, a useful test of
the theory requires a collection of cases involving the U.S.
government. Second, policymakers and macroeconomists widely
believe that tax laws can and should be used to effectuate economic
39
growth and stability, and thus it is reasonable to expect the Justices
to rely on economic outcomes in assessing challenged government tax
policies. Finally, Congress and the president have constantly revised
the tax laws over the periods of this study and thus we have quite a bit
of variation in the data, thereby enabling a full and complete
40
investigation of our theory.
B. Implementing the Plan
Having outlined our basic plan, we turn to the specific features of
our empirical test. Because we sought to explain the outcomes in
federal tax cases, both for and against the government, the first order
of business was to amass a dataset of every tax case argued before the
Court between 1913, when the Court heard its first federal tax
41
challenge to the modern corporate and individual tax laws, and 1940.

REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 82–162 (1995); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE
SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN 98 (rev. ed. 1968); ROBERT G. MCCLOKSEY AS
REVISED BY STANFORD LEVINSON, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 91 (4th ed. 2005);
WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE 20TH CENTURY: THE NEW
LEGALITY, 1932–1968, at 28–55 (1970).
39. LANGDANA, supra note 18, at 10.
40. See JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME
TAX 75–109 (1985); see also STEVEN A. BANK, KIRK J. STARK & JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE, WAR
AND TAXES 49–90 (2008) (exploring changes in American tax policy between World Wars I and
II).
41. Congress enacted the first modern individual income tax legislation in 1913 following
the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN, JOSEPH BANKMAN &
DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 5 (14th ed. 2006). Four years prior, in 1909,
Congress enacted the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909, which levied a tax on corporate income
and has been viewed as a stepping stone toward the modern income tax. See Act of Aug. 5,
1909, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112; see also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the
Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 53 (1990). For cases stemming from the
individual income tax enacted after the Sixteenth Amendment, the earliest oral arguments in
our sample occurred on October 14, 1915. Cases in our sample with oral arguments before this
date related to the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909.
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To do so, we conducted a Lexis search on the word “tax.” We
reviewed each case produced by the search, retaining only those that
involved the Justices’ interpretation of a federal tax statute. Thus, we
excluded state taxation cases, as well as cases that involved tax fraud
but no statutory interpretation problem. This resulted in a collection
of 594 cases, dispersed over twenty-eight years. As Figure 1 depicts,
the distribution of cases is rather uneven—the Justices heard and
decided more cases during the second era of our study than the first
43
(about 10.4 per year through 1929 and 38.9 per year thereafter).
Figure 1. Tax Cases in the U.S. Supreme Court by Year of Oral
Argument, 1913–1940

42. The Lexis search that we conducted read as follows: (federal w/s tax!) or (excise w/s
tax!) or (estate w/s tax!) or (user w/5 fee) or (user w/s tax!) or (tax! w/s fraud) or (irc) or (i.r.c.)
or (stamp w/s tax!) or (income w/s tax!) or (internal w/s revenue) or (tax! w/s lien) or (tax! w/s
code) or (tax! w/s evad!) or (tax! w/s evasion) or (corporate w/s tax!) or (payroll w/s tax!) or
(employment w/s tax!) or (social w/s security) or (26 usc) or (26 u.s.c.) or (tax! w/s refund) or
(tax! w/s deficiency) or (unemployment w/s tax!) or (gift w/s tax!) or (fica w/s tax!) or (f.i.c.a. w/s
tax!). We selected only those cases with oral arguments between 1913 and 1940. We then
refined our search as described infra text accompanying note 43.
43. This difference appears to be due to a change in the Court’s preference for tax cases as
the total number of cases decided by the Court actually declined somewhat during the 1930s
relative to the pre-1930s period of our analysis. This change in preference may correspond to an
underlying change in the nature of the tax cases heard that we have not accounted for, and as
such it represents a potential limitation of our analysis.
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With the cases in hand, we coded our primary dependent
variable (that is, what we hope to explain) in two different ways. We
first coded the Court’s Outcome as a binary variable: whether the
government won (=1) or lost (=0) and, for robustness checks, we also
coded the government’s share of votes, which is the fraction of
Justices participating in the case and voting in the government’s
44
favor. A Vote Share of 0 indicates a unanimous decision in the
private litigant’s favor, a Vote Share of 1 indicates a unanimous
decision in the government’s favor, a Vote Share of .5 indicates that 50
percent of the sitting Justices voted with the government, and so
forth.
Table 1 supplies summary statistics for Outcome and Vote Share
(along with all other variables in our study), so we need not say too
much more about them. Suffice it to note that the difference in the
government’s win rate—however measured—between the two eras of
45
interest is not statistically significantly different. The question is
whether the U.S. government’s success is correlated at statistically
significant levels with the economic contractions and expansions
occurring within those periods (consistent with our economic model)
or whether the government’s success is simply constant over time (as
46
the legal model would predict) or associated with the political values
of the Justices (as the political model predicts).
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Variable
Outcome

Mean

Std.

(Proportion)

Deviation

.658

.475

Minimum

Maximum

0 (US lost)

1 (US won)

44. We run our primary tests with the binary outcome variable as the dependent variable,
and then we perform another set of tests with the share of votes as the dependent variable. The
purpose of this second set of tests is to check whether the results we obtain in the primary test
still hold true when we conduct similar but somewhat differently structured tests. In this way, we
check whether our primary analysis is robust to changes in the particular type of analysis we
perform.
45. The difference in the rates is not statistically significant if it is small enough that it is
likely to occur by random chance. In general, a value is statistically significant if the probability
that it would occur by random chance is lower than some specified threshold confidence level.
Throughout this work, we use a 5 percent confidence level for statistical significance, unless
otherwise indicated.
46. Under the legal model, the government’s win rate will not change in a statistically
significant way over time if the characteristics of the cases heard do not change in a statistically
significant way. Thus, when the economic climate changes, we expect a roughly constant win
rate for the government, provided that the nature of the cases heard remains roughly constant.
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Pre-1930

.607

.490

0

1

1930s

.678

.468

0

1

Vote Share

.652

.440

0 (no votes for US)

1 (unanimous for

Pre-1930

.600

.461

0

1

1930s

.671

.431

0

1

.557

.497

0 (contraction)

1 (expansion)

Pre-1930

.675

.470

0

1

1930s

.512

.500

0

1

.001

.032

-.089

.166

1919–1929

.004

.029

-.082

.094

1930s

.000

.033

-.088

.166

Fraction

.655

.148

.22

.78

Pre-1930

.755

.046

.67

.78

1930s

.616

.156

.22

.78

.551

.497

0 (respondent)

1 (petitioner)

Pre-1930

.560

.498

0

1

1930s

.547

.498

0

1

Corporate

.364

.481

0 (not corporate)

1 (corporate)

Pre-1930

.373

.485

0

1

1930s

.360

.480

0

1

.059

.236

0 (no)

1 (yes)

Pre-1930

.096

.296

0

1

1930s

.044

.206

0

1

US)

Economic Cycles

Industrial
Production

Republicans on
Court

Government is
Petitioner

Taxpayer

War-Related Law

This brings us to our study’s independent variables—those we
(or others) think explain the government’s success or lack thereof.
For our approach, the key variable of interest is the state of the
economy. As noted above, we hoped to tap into both the “typical”
business cycle—the repeated sequence of economic expansion, giving
way to a decline, and then followed by recovery—as well as the
extreme conditions that emerged during the Great Depression. Were
we analyzing litigation in, say, the last several decades, we could turn
to any number of indicators associated with the economy, including
consumption, investment, employment, or inflation. Unfortunately,
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reliable historical data are rare and thus we have only a limited
selection of measures. Two that are valid, reliable, and available for
(most of) the years in our study are Economic Cycles and Industrial
Production.
Cycles is the series of economic peaks (high points) and troughs
(low points) as identified by the NBER Dating Committee. After the
economy peaks, aggregate economic activity tends to fall, sending the
economy into an official contraction or recession. After the economy
reaches a trough, it tends to return to a period of expansion, booming
until it hits the next peak in the cycle. To incorporate cycles into our
statistical model, we coded the relative state of the economy at the
time the Justices heard oral argument—either at expansion (=1) or
47
contraction (=0). Industrial Production measures the change in
output for the industrial sector of the economy, including
48
manufacturing, mining, and utilities. For Industrial Production, we
identified the average percentage change in industrial production
over the month prior to oral argument for each case heard since 1919
(the first year for which we could locate reliable data).
Finally, we gathered data on several other covariates that
scholars have suggested explain the Court’s decisions. Beginning with
political accounts of judging, for each case we coded the fraction of
Justices appointed by Republican presidents. Theoretically this
variable could range from 0 to 1, but empirically the proportion of
49
Republican-appointed Justices in the dataset ranges from .22 to .78.
50
Our reasoning, in line with the extant literature, was that, at least for
our time frame, a Court dominated by Republican appointees would
be less likely to support government efforts to regulate the economy
51
than a Court populated by Democrats. Along a similar vein, we
incorporated a variable indicating whether or not the United States
was the petitioner (=1) or the respondent (=0) in the Supreme Court.
This controls for the propensity of (at least) the modern-day Court to
47. See infra Table 5: The Business Cycle. For a complete historical table of the business
cycle, see Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, supra note 10.
48. Although these sectors contribute only a small portion of GDP, they are highly
sensitive to interest rates and consumer demand and thus industrial production is viewed as an
important tool for forecasting national economic performances. See ABEL ET AL., supra note 7,
at 300.
49. See supra Table 1: Summary Statistics.
50. See Nancy Staudt, Lee Epstein & Peter Wiedenbeck, The Ideological Component of
Judging in the Taxation Context, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1797, 1800 (2006).
51. In our database, Democratic Courts decided 59 percent of the cases (n=488);
Republican Courts, 41 percent (n=339).
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reverse lower court decisions, which, in turn, may reflect strategic
52
political considerations on the part of the Justices.
Finally, two other covariates reflect the substantive focus of our
study, taxation. One variable is whether the party opposing the
government is a corporate taxpayer or not. We included this variable
for two reasons. First, Congress implemented the individual income
53
tax in 1913 under highly contentious circumstances and thus it is
possible that the Justices’ views of the individual and corporate
income taxes diverged for any number of reasons unrelated to the
observable variables in our model. Second, previous empirical work
suggests that judicial political preferences are more evident in
corporate tax cases than in other contexts. Thus controlling for the
party opposing the government enabled us to better parse the
54
possible political factors at work. We also added a control for
whether the tax measure at issue in the litigation was related to a warrelated law, such as the War Revenue Act of 1917. Our data indicate
that the Justices are highly predisposed to favor the government in
55
war-related cases, and by adding this control we were able to obtain
more precise results (that is, lower standard errors for the
independent variables of interest).
C. Statistical Models and Predictions
For purposes of identifying the possible influence of national
economic conditions on the U.S. Supreme Court, we examined the
effects of macroeconomic variables on the probability of a win for the
federal government. To this end, as we just noted, we specified two
dependent variables: Outcome, which is simply whether the
government won (=1) or lost (=0); and Vote Share, which is the
percentage of Justices on the Court who voted with the government.
Owing to the high correlation between our independent variables,
Economic Cycle and Industrial Production, we could not use both in

52. Jan Palmer, An Econometric Analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions,
39 PUB. CHOICE 387, 390–91 (1982).
53. For a discussion of the history leading up to the ratification of the Sixteenth
Amendment and the subsequent enactment of the modern income tax in 1913, see KLEIN ET
AL., supra note 41, at 4–5.
54. See Staudt et al., supra note 50, at 1800.
55. Over the course of the entire pre-1930 and 1930s eras, the cases in our data set have a
government win rate of approximately 65 percent overall, but this number increases to
approximately 80 percent when only cases dealing with war-related laws are considered.
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56

the same statistical model. Accordingly, we constructed separate
models, hoping that they would produce consistent results regardless
of the particular economic indicator. If our theory holds, both
indicators should be positively correlated with the government’s win
rate during the first period (pre-1930) and negatively correlated
during the second period (the Depression years).
For the dependent variable, Outcome, we used a logit model to
determine the effect of the economy on the case outcome. This type
of model expresses the probability of a government win in terms of
the inverse logit function. The models for our two different economic
independent variables are

Pr(Yit = 1) = logit −1 (β 0 + β1 Economic_Cyclet + βX it )

(1)

Pr(Yit = 1) = logit −1 (β 0 + β1 Industrial_Productiont + βX it ) (2)
in which Yit is the value of the Outcome variable in case i in month t.
In each model, the coefficient β1 represents the influence of the
economy on the probability of a government win. The expression βXit
denotes the other independent variables for which we controlled,
including the fraction of Republican appointees on the Court, a
binary variable equal to 1 if the United States is the appellant and 0
otherwise, a binary variable equal to 1 if the taxpayer is a corporation
and 0 otherwise, and a binary variable equal to 1 if the law is related
to a war and 0 otherwise.
For the dependent variable, Vote Share, we used an ordinary
least squares model to determine the effect of the economy on the
case outcome. The models for our two different economic
independent variables in this case are

Yit = β 0 + β 1 Economic_Cyclet + βX it

(3)

Yit = β 0 + β 1 Industrial_Productiont + βX it

(4)

in which Yit is the value of the Vote Share variable in case i in month t.
The coefficient β1 again represents the influence of the economy on

56. The models we use require independent variables in a single model to be uncorrelated.
If this requirement is not met, there is said to be collinearity between the variables, which can
cause biased estimates of the results as well as inflated error terms. See JACK JOHNSTON &
JOHN DINARDO, ECONOMETRIC METHODS 89 (4th ed. 1997).
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the probability of a government win, and the expression βXit again
denotes the other independent variables we controlled for.
Recall that we theorized that that the Justices would act like
voters in the pre-1930 era, rewarding the federal government for
observed economic growth and productivity and punishing
policymakers for national economic decline. If the “Justices as
voters” model aptly characterizes the Court’s decisions, then
economic downturns should cause a decrease in government win rate.
Accordingly, we expected the Economic Cycle and Industrial
Production variables to yield positive coefficients (economic
expansions and high levels of industrial production trend with a high
level of progovernment outcomes).
In the 1930s, a period in which the nation experienced a severe
depression, we expected that the Justices would not attribute
economic outcomes to policymaking competence but to exogenous
shocks beyond the control of the economic managers. In this context,
our theory suggests that the Justices would seek not to punish elected
officials for economic conditions but to work as a “team” to stimulate
national recovery. Thus, we expected the Economic Cycle and
Industrial Production variables to produce negative coefficients
(economic contractions and lower levels of industrial production
trend with a high level of progovernment outcomes).
D. Unobservable and Immeasurable Variables
Before turning to our empirical results, we would like to
comment on the possibility of confounding by unobservable and
immeasurable variables that could affect judicial decisionmaking but
were necessarily left out of our models. To see the problem, it is
important to understand that we conceptualized the economic
conditions as if they were a “treatment” on the Justices. Empiricists
label this type of study a “natural experiment” or “quasi-experiment”
because the treatment arguably arose due to an exogenous event
completely outside the control of the subjects under investigation
57
(here the Justices on the Supreme Court). In our study, the Justices
themselves did not cause the economic expansion or contraction and

57. An example of a natural experiment in another context is the study by Sargent,
Shepard, and Glantz of the effect of a smoking ban (the treatment) on the incidence of hospital
admissions for heart attacks in Helena, Montana. Richard P. Sargent, Robert M. Shepard &
Stanton A. Glantz, Reduced Incidence of Admissions for Myocardial Infarction Associated with
Public Smoking Ban: Before and After Study, 328 BRIT. MED. J. 977, 977–80 (2004).
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did not control production in the manufacturing, mining, or utility
sectors of the economy. Many experts argue that identifying the true
cause of macroeconomic cycles or production levels is impossible for
anyone; observers know they shift and change but not what causes the
58
observed variation.
A natural or quasi-experiment always has a control group, which
is not affected by the event, and a treatment group, which the
experimenter believes is affected. The behaviors or outcomes of the
two groups are compared for purposes of measuring the effects of the
59
treatment on the population of interest. In our study, for example,
the cases on the Court’s docket during declining economic periods
were subject to the recessionary treatment, whereas the cases decided
in prosperous times comprise the control group. If the government’s
win rate in the treated cases diverges from that observed for the
control group, then we have evidence that the economy affects
judicial decisionmaking.
The central feature of a classic randomized experiment—the
existence of a control group to estimate what would have happened in
the absence of the treatment—underlies the idea of a natural
experiment, which this study relies on to identify the effects of
economic conditions. In the natural experiment, just as in a classic
experiment, the researcher must make use of the differences in
outcomes between the treatment group and a control group. The
natural experiment differs from the classic experiment, though, in
that the treatment status emerges through nature rather than at the
60
hand of the scientist. The fact that the treatment status in our study
was not determined by a randomized procedure but by some other
force raises the possibility that any comparison between our two
groups of cases will be biased. To determine the credibility of the
natural experiment—and to ensure unbiased results—it is important
to examine the characteristics of the cases in both the control and
treatment groups. Valid causal inferences require that the treatment
and control groups be identical on all relevant factors. If the two
groups differ, then it is possible that the observed differences in
judicial outcomes have nothing to do with the economy and

58. See ABEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 282–443 (exploring competing explanations for
emerging economic conditions).
59. DAVID CARD & ALAN B. KRUEGER, MYTH AND MEASUREMENT: THE NEW
ECONOMICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE 22–23 (1995).
60. Id.
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everything to do with the type of case litigated in the Court or the
61
judicial makeup of the Court.
For the purposes of this study, the data suggest that our
treatment and control groups are similar with respect to three of our
four independent variables: Government As Appellant, Corporate
Taxpayer, and War-Related Legislation. Table 2 provides summary
statistics for these variables for the treatment and control groups as
well as results for statistical comparison tests between the two groups.
These statistics offer some evidence to support the credibility of this
natural experiment in assessing the effects of the macroeconomy on
the Court. It is impossible, however, to identify unobservable factors
that might impact judicial outcomes such as litigant strategies that
might shift with economic conditions. If either party pursues cases it
believes are easier (or harder) to win because of macroeconomic
factors, then this fact could explain the empirical results obtained, not
the economy itself. Our empirical results could also be confounded if
the Justices grant certiorari to different types of cases in recessionary
periods than in periods of economic prosperity.
Table 2. Statistical Comparison of Treatment and Control Groups
Variable

Treatment Group
Mean

Std.
Dev.

Control Group
Mean

Statistically

Std.

Different

Dev.

(Y/N)

62

Pre-1930
(54 treatment cases and
112 control cases)
Government is Petitioner

.574

.499

.554

.499

N

Corporate Taxpayer

.296

.461

.411

.494

N

War-related Law

.093

.293

.098

.299

N

1930s
(209 treatment cases and
219 control cases)
Government is Petitioner

.555

.498

.539

.500

N

Corporate Taxpayer

.359

.481

.361

.481

N

War-related Law

.086

.281

.005

.068

Y

63

61. For a terrific discussion of the empirical dangers associated with natural experiments,
see Bruce D. Meyer, Natural and Quasi-Experiments in Economics, 13 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT.
151, 151–61 (1995).
62. We report that there is a statistical difference if a t-test between the control and
treatment groups shows that the mean values for the two groups are different to a statistically
significant level.
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For purposes of this Essay, we make the (heroic) assumption that
we constructed a legitimate natural experiment. In further research,
however, we plan to investigate whether a selection problem in fact
exists in the study, potentially raising doubts about the conclusions
reached here. Indeed, this selection problem may exist in all empirical
studies of the Supreme Court, but no scholar has systematically
investigated the problem. Accordingly, we focus on this gap in the
literature, seeking to fill it not only for this particular study but for all
64
future studies of courts.
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
With this important caveat, we turn to the results of our
modeling exercise. Overall, we find support for our theory: the
Justices act like voters in “typical business cycles,” casting
antigovernment votes in times of economic downturns and
progovernment votes in periods when the economy is booming. In
“atypical times,” when the economy moves into a state of crisis, the
Justices do not adopt the role of a disciplinarian but seek to support
the government in an effort to help return the economy to a state of
growth and stability.
65
Tables 3 and 4 present our findings. Table 3, which presents the
results for the typical business cycle, shows that, regardless of how we
66
specify the model, the Justices seem to use the economy as a signal
for whether to reward or punish the U.S. government. Specifically,
when the economic cycle is on the uptick (or industrial production is
relatively high), the government’s win rate increases, as indicated by
63. The war-law variable for the 1930s period is the only instance of a statistically
significant difference between our treatment and control groups. This results because, of the
nineteen cases relating to war laws during the 1930s, all but one of these were heard by the
Court during treatment periods rather than control periods. As a result, there is a significant
difference between the value of the war-law variable during the treatment and control periods
of the 1930s.
64. For a preliminary investigation, see Tyler J. VanderWeele & Nancy C. Staudt, Causal
Diagrams for Empirical Legal Research: Methodology for Identifying Causation, Avoiding
Bias, and Interpreting Results (Mar. 26, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (explaining how investigators can address selection problems by using causal
graphs to clarify qualitative modeling assumptions).
65. Because we expect the coefficients to have different signs in the two different eras, we
estimate the models separately to avoid results that simply present the average of the two time
periods of interest.
66. The one exception here is Model 4, in which the coefficient on Industrial Production is
correctly signed but fails to reach a standard level of statistical significance (p < .05). Its p-value
is .059.
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the positive coefficients on the economic variables. Put differently,
even after controlling for the Court’s composition and various
features of its selection process, along with other relevant covariates,
the Justices seem to be responding positively to (their perceptions of)
competent economic management. And vice versa.
67

Table 3. Results for Pre-1930 Regressions
Variable
Economic Cycle

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

(Outcome)

(Vote Share)

(Outcome)

(Vote Share)

.967*

.163*

(.362)

(.076)
16.541*

2.263

(6.43)

(1.187)

Industrial Production
Fraction Republican

-.255

-.121

-3.111

-.565

(3.717)

(.713)

(7.64)

(1.152)

-.956*

-.220*

-.773*

-.186*

(.368)

(.072)

(.398)

(.081)

.699

.172*

.999*

.224*

(.369)

(.071)

(.436)

(.082)

-.511

-.159

-.721

-.191

(.578)

(.106)

(.603)

(.115)

.332

.657

2.944

1.067

(2.800)

(.541)

(5.88)

(.881)

N

163

166

135

138

Log-Likelihood

-100.123

Government Side

Corporate Taxpayer

War-Related Law

Constant

-84.144

Note: In Models 1 and 3, the dependent variable is whether the U.S. government won (=1)
or lost (=0). We estimated these models using logistic regression, with robust standard
errors in parentheses. In Models 2 and 4, the dependent variable is the fraction of Justices
casting a vote in favor of the U.S. government. We estimated these models using ordinary
least squares regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. An asterisk indicates a
p value of less than .05.

67. The Stata code for generating these results with the data available on the website for
this paper is as follows: for Model 1: logit outcome cycle PropRCt_dec govtside corp_tp war_law
if year_oral<1930, robust; for Model 2: regress outcome_share cycle PropRCt_dec govtside
corp_tp war_law if year_oral<1930, robust; for Model 3: logit outcome indpro_pctchg1m
PropRCt_dec govtside corp_tp war_law if year_oral<1930, robust; and for Model 4: regress
outcome_share indpro_pctchg1m PropRCt_dec govtside corp_tp war_law if year_oral<1930,
robust.
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Moreover, the response is not merely statistically significant but
also substantial in magnitude. To provide but one example: setting all
other variables in Model 2 at their mean or mode, when the
government is the petitioner and Economic Cycle equals 1, over half
of the sitting Justices can be expected to vote in the government’s
68
favor. Holding this scenario constant but making Economic Cycle
equal 0, the government’s expected vote share falls to about one-third
69
of the Court.
With respect to the 1930s, a period of extended economic crisis,
we obtained results precisely opposite those we obtained for the pre1930 period. As Table 4 shows (and again regardless of how we
specify the model), as the economy deteriorates even further, the
government’s expected vote share (and its likelihood of success)
actually increases. This result follows from our theory that, during a
depression-like period, the Justices will side more often with the
government in times of relative economic contraction in order to help
70
fend off the crisis. All else being equal, during depression-like
periods, as economic conditions move from bad to worse, we would
expect the government’s vote share to equal about three-fourths of
71
the sitting Justices.

68. .51, with a 95 percent confidence interval of .39, .63.
69. .34, with 95 percent confidence interval of .19, .49. The Stata code for generating the
results of this paragraph using the data available on the website for this paper makes use of SPost and is as follows: for the Model 2 regression: regress outcome_share cycle PropRCt_dec
govtside corp_tp war_law if year_oral<1930, robust; for the prediction when Economic Cycle is
0: prvalue, x(cycle=0 PropRCt_dec=mean govtside=1 corp_tp=0 war_law=0); for the prediction
when Economic Cycle is 1: prvalue, x(cycle=1 PropRCt_dec=mean govtside=1 corp_tp=0
war_law=0).
70. We made all else equal by setting all other variables at their mean or mode when the
government is the appellant and the economic cycle is negative. The Stata code for generating
the results of this paragraph using the data available on the website for this paper makes use of
S-Post and is as follows: for the Model 2 regression: regress outcome_share cycle PropRCt_dec
govtside corp_tp war_law if year_oral>=1930 & year_oral<=1940, robust; for the prediction
when Economic Cycle is 0: prvalue, x(cycle=0 PropRCt_dec=mean govtside=1 corp_tp=0
war_law=0); for the prediction when Economic Cycle is 1: prvalue, x(cycle=1
PropRCt_dec=mean govtside=1 corp_tp=0 war_law=0).
71. The point estimate for the vote share is .73, with a 95 percent confidence interval of .65
to .80. (It decreases to under about .50, with a 95 percent confidence interval of .42 to .58, when
the economy looks to be recovering.)
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72

Table 4. Results for the 1930s Regressions
Variable
Economic Cycle

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

(outcome)

(vote share)

(outcome)

(vote share)

-1.243*

-.226*

(.246)

(.044)
-7.154*

-1.346*

(3.496)

(.607)

Industrial Production

Fraction Republican

-1.958*

-.191

-.241

.115

(.752)

(.136)

(.651)

(.130)

-.419

-.096*

-.350

-.086*

(.223)

(.041)

(.215)

(.042)

.247

.027

.272

.034

(.232)

(.044)

(.226)

(.045)

1.784

.180*

2.093*

.231*

(1.087)

(.070)

(1.075)

(.069)

2.747*

.939*

.950*

.625*

(.598)

(.103)

(.446)

(.088)

N

428

428

428

428

Log-Likelihood

-249.077

Government Side

Corporate Taxpayer

War-Related Law

Constant

-259.981

Note: In Models 1 and 3, the dependent variable is whether the U.S. government won (=1) or
lost (=0). We estimated these models using logistic regression, with robust standard errors in
parentheses. In Models 2 and 4 the dependent variable is the fraction of Justices casting a vote
in favor of the U.S. government. We estimated these models using ordinary least squares
regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. An asterisk indicates a p value of less
than .05.

Taking the two eras collectively the comparison is stark, as
Figure 2 shows. This figure depicts the predicted probability of a win

72. The Stata code for generating these results with the data available on the paper website
is as follows: for Model 1: logit outcome cycle PropRCt_dec govtside corp_tp war_law if
year_oral>=1930 & year_oral<=1940, robust; for Model 2: regress outcome_share cycle
PropRCt_dec govtside corp_tp war_law if year_oral>=1930 & year_oral<=1940, robust; for
Model 3: logit outcome indpro_pctchg1m PropRCt_dec govtside corp_tp war_law if
year_oral>=1930 & year_ oral<=1940, robust; and for Model 4: regress outcome_share
indpro_pctchg1m PropRCt_dec govtside corp_tp war_law if year_oral>=1930 &
year_oral<=1940, robust.
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for the federal government during downturns in the economy for the
crisis and noncrisis periods in our dataset (with all other variables at
their modes or means). The government, whether petitioner or
respondent, was far more likely to prevail during troughs in the Great
Depression than in downturns occurring in the earlier era. When the
United States was a petitioner in tax suits prior to 1930 and the
economy was in a downward spiral, we predicted defeat for the
United States in seven out of ten disputes. But for the 1930s
depression era, we predicted a win for the government in seven out of
ten cases.

Predicted Probability of a Win for the Government

Figure 2. Predicted Probability that the Government Will Prevail in
Periods of Economic Decline

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
Government is Respondent
Pre-1930s

Government is Petitioner
1930s

Note: The predicted probabilities are based on Model 1 in Tables 3 (pre-1930)
and 4 (1930s) with the economic cycle set at 0 and all other variables set at
their mean or mode. As the figure indicates, regardless of the government’s
position, it won quite a bit more often in the 1930s depression era than in the
pre-1930 cycle.

These findings offer preliminary support for our model. They
also point out that the period was more complex than is suggested by
much commentary arguing that the Justices regularly decided cases
against the U.S. government in the 1930s, sparking President
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73

Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan. In fact, during the 1930s—at least in
the context of taxation cases—the Justices exhibited a strong and
unambiguous preference in favor of the federal government, not
74
against the government as the conventional wisdom holds.
Importantly, our results are not driven by decisions rendered after
February 1937, when the Court-packing plan was unveiled; we
reestimated our models using only cases orally argued prior to that
75
date and obtained nearly identical results.
Our theory and empirical results not only enhance our
understanding of the Court and challenge existing literature on
interbranch dynamics during the 1930s, but they also carry
implications for the economic crisis emerging in 2008. Much like the
Depression era, a Republican Court and a Democratic government
are in place. At least in the area of taxation, it is quite possible that
73. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 38, at 180 (“It was apparent that the immediate difficulty
was with the Justices, not the Court . . . . It was only a bare majority of them whose hostility to
the Administration was so fixed and extreme . . . .”); C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT
COURT 5–6 (1948) (detailing the law struck down by the Supreme Court, and then noting that
“[t]hese leads from the Supreme Court were promptly followed by the lower federal courts,
which proceeded to grant during 1935 and 1936 some 1600 injunctions restraining officers of the
federal government from carrying out acts of Congress”); SWINDLER, supra note 38, at 48 (“As
though it were impatient for Aramgeddon, the Court in 1936 cast one affront after another into
the teeth of the New Dealers.”). This is also a view repeated in many constitutional law
casebooks. See, e.g., JEROME A. BARRON, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 93
(7th ed. 2006) (“The programs of the New Deal were designed to ameliorate the impact of the
depression . . . .The early challenges to the philosophy represented by the efforts, produced
Supreme Court results that were not favorable to the administration.”); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 129–30 (2005) (“By the mid-1930s, there were enormous pressures for
a change in the Supreme Court’s narrow approach to defining the scope of Congress’s
power. . . . [T]he Court also was narrowly interpreting the scope of other Congressional
powers . . . .”); CRAIG R. DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 308 (9th ed. 2009)
(“Tenacious adherence to an artificial view of the economy . . . ultimately set the Executive and
the Court on a collision course.”); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 94 (16th ed. 2007) (“The 1935 and 1936 decisions persuaded the
Roosevelt Administration that strong measures were needed to save the New Deal from judicial
invalidation. Several major New Deal laws had already been held unconstitutional;
others . . . might well have met a similar fate.”). Even PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (2006), which drops a footnote noting Barry Cushman’s
Rethinking the New Deal challenge to this “conventional” portrayal of the confrontation
between Roosevelt, id. at 499 n.1, rehearses the more conventional approach in the text when
they quote McCloskey, id. at 511 (“[T]he Court waged what is surely the
most ambitious dragon-fight in its long and checkered history.” (quoting MCCLOSKEY, supra
note 38, at 110)).
74. See, e.g., LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 38, at 142–44.
75. The coefficients on the variable cycle are positive and statistically significant in our
reestimated models. The coefficients on industrial production are also positive but do not
achieve statistical significance.
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the Roberts Court will join forces with the Obama administration to
operate as a team to enable economic recovery. Put differently, if the
Justices perceive the economic conditions of crisis that began in 2008
as atypically negative, we should expect opinions that defer to rather
than punish federal policymakers.
These are but a few possible implications of our study, but
“possible” is the operative word given the preliminary nature of our
work and a number of important limitations. To name just a few:
Unobservable and Immeasurable Variables. As we noted in Part
II.D, it is entirely possible that the kinds of cases the government
litigate and the Justices decide to hear differ during peaks and
troughs in the business cycle. For purposes of this study, we decided
to put this concern to the side (as do virtually all scholars of the
Court). Because this was likely a perilous choice, in follow-up
analyses we intend to make use of methods developed in the
statistical sciences to deal with the selection problem we confronted
in this initial study.
Variations in the Nature of Cases Between Periods. The annual
number of tax cases decided by the Court increased substantially
76
from the pre-1930 period to the 1930s period. This change could
reflect a change in the nature of the tax cases being heard. In
addition, other factors may alter the nature of the tax cases being
heard over time. Because a change in the nature of the cases could
affect the probability of the government winning, in follow-up
analyses we intend to study further whether the nature of the cases
actually changes, as well as to control for any such changes.
The Justices’ Political Preferences. For this study, we captured
the Court’s political preferences with a measure keyed to the
percentage of the Court appointed by a Republican president.
Although we believe that partisanship is the most relevant factor in
decisionmaking in the economic context, other formulations are
possible. Moreover, in light of dominant theories in political science,
it may be worthwhile to consider measures designed to tap the
Justices’ ideologies, even if only as a robustness check.
The Political Context. Legal and political models are quite
prevalent in the social science literature, so are institutional accounts.
These accounts may differ slightly but their basic idea is the same.
The core idea is that the Justices, whether to maintain their legitimacy
76. See supra note 43.
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or to maximize their policy preferences (that is, to ensure that the
ultimate state of law reflects, to the extent possible, their preferred
policies), attend to preferences and likely actions of the elected
branches. We, in turn, should attend to this account in our model,
incorporating variables designed to represent the preferences of the
various political actors. Doing so would also enable us to detect
whether Republican Courts, for example, defer to Republican but not
Democratic governments during times of economic crisis.
CONCLUSION
Scholars and commentators have long argued that Supreme
Court Justices seek to advance legal and political goals in the
decisionmaking process. But for just as long they have ignored the
role macroeconomy may play in disputes involving economic
regulation. We sought to fill this gap by considering the effect of
variables designed to tap the state of the macroeconomy—Economic
Cycles and Industrial Production—after controlling for the political
composition of the Court and various other independent variables
that may explain outcomes or confound our results. We found
preliminary support for our model.
APPENDIX
In what follows we supply more information on the measures of
the macroeconomy we used in our statistical analyses.
A. Correlation Table. Figure 3 illustrates the correlation of our
economic variables of interest. Using data from 1919 to 1940, we
found the Economic Cycle and Industrial Production variables to
have a positive correlation of 49 percent. We also calculated the
correlation between the sign (either plus or minus one) of the
Industrial Production and Economic Cycle variables, and we obtained
a value of 54 percent. Finally, we calculated the correlation between
the Industrial Production variable and its sign to be 76 percent.
The fact that the economic cycle variable is binary instead of
continuous means that care must be taken in interpreting our
calculated values. Ideally, we would like to have a continuous version
of the Economic Cycle variable and find its correlation with the
Industrial Production variable, but because no such continuous
variable is observed, we cannot undertake such a calculation. We
instead make our variables more comparable by considering the sign
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of the Industrial Production variable, a binary quantity. The
correlation of this new binary variable with the Economic Cycle
variable is 54 percent. To provide a sense of how this value relates to
a correlation between continuous variables, we note that, if two
normally distributed random variables have signs with a correlation
of 54 percent, then the correlation between the underlying continuous
77
variables is actually 75 percent.
Figure 3. Correlation Relationships Among Economic Cycle,
Industrial Production, and Sign of Industrial Production

77.

The formula for the correlation between the signs of two normally distributed random

variables is

1−

(tan (1 / t ) − tan (t )) , in which t =
π
2

−1

−1

1+ c − 1− c
1+ c + 1− c

, and c is

the correlation between the continuous random variables. Substituting c =.75 into this formula
yields a value of approximately .54.
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B. The Business Cycle. We used NBER data to determine when
the country was in a state of recession—the period between a trough
and peak. Table 5 provides the dates of recessions occurring during
the period from 1912 to 1945. Figure 4 illustrates the cycle of
recessions and expansions during this period.
Table 5. The Business Cycle
Date of
Trough
Jan. 1912
Dec. 1914
Mar. 1919
July 1921
July 1924
Nov. 1927
Mar. 1933
June 1938

Length of Following
Expansion (Months)
12
44
(World War I)
10
22
27
21
50
80

Date of
Peak
Jan. 1913
Aug. 1918
Jan. 1920
May 1923
Oct. 1926
Aug. 1929
May 1937
Feb. 1945

Length of Following
Contraction (Months)
23
7
18
14
13
43
(Great Depression Starts)
13
8

Figure 4. Graphical Depiction of the Business Cycle
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C. Industrial Production. We used Industrial Production Index
data from “FRED,” a public database made available by the Federal
Reserve in St. Louis, as the basis for computing our industrial
78
production variable. The index is normalized to have a value of 100
in 2002, and our Industrial Production variable is calculated as the
one-month percentage change in the index.
Figure 5 shows how the industrial production index varied over
the time period from 1919 to 1940, and the gray shaded regions
correspond to periods of economic contraction (i.e., periods in which
the economic cycle variable is equal to 0). Figure 6 illustrates the
values of our Industrial Production variable over this same time
period with empty circles denoting times of economic expansion and
filled-in circles denoting times of economic contraction. Figure 7
shows the values of our Industrial Production variable for only those
months appearing in the set of oral argument dates for our data.
Points in this plot have areas corresponding to the number of times a
particular month appeared in our data.
Figure 5. Industrial Production

78. The “FRED” database is available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
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Figure 6. Historic One-Month Changes in Industrial Production

Figure 7. One-Month Changes in Industrial Production in Sample

